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A disclaimer first: This is quite a late review, and I alone am responsible for 
the delay, for which I offer my apologies to the author, the journal editor, 
and the publisher alike. 
Hart’s book is in effect, albeit not quite in composition, made up of two 
portions. The larger portion is chiefly methodological and historiographical, 
the other one mostly empirical in the sense of describing and seeking to 
explain a range of events closely connected to what the book’s subtitle 
announces as its principal theme: ‘the first encounter between China and 
the West’. By this is centrally meant the translation, completed in 1607 by 
Father Matteo Ricci SJ and the Ming mandarin Xu Guangqi 徐光啟 together, 
of the first six books of Euclid’s Elements—what kind of translation this was 
and, above all, what their joint effort signified in terms of the history of 
Chinese mathematics under the Ming dynasty. 
I shall now first dwell briefly on the book’s empirical portion, which 
gives me occasion for my second disclaimer: I am not a sinologist but a 
historian of science given to cross-cultural comparison, and it is surely in 
that capacity that I have been invited to review the present book. So my 
area of competence is confined in the main to the book’s more theory-filled 
portions. With its empirical portion I can responsibly deal only to the 
extent of simply outlining its principal findings for the reader’s benefit. 
This is followed by more critical glances at the how and why of the rather 
idiosyncratic selection of pertinent events made by the author, and at the 
extent to which the interpretation thereof can really be said to underwrite 
the hugely ambitious claims made in the book’s methodological / 
historiographical pages. 
The book’s empirical portion, then, has two main subjects. One is the 
exposition and interpretation of a range of mathematical treatises of the 
Ming period printed prior to the appearance of the Euclid translation. The 
other is several early memorials written by its Chinese co-translator, Xu 
Guangqi, for the benefit of the last Ming emperor, and allegedly neglected 
by all previous historians. 
As to the former subject, those Ming treatises, the point of their 
treatment in the book is twofold. Roger Hart is originally, and still quite 
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visibly so, a philosopher, who later turned to Ming mathematics and wrote 
a book about it. In the summaries that he renders here, he is concerned to 
show that what underlies these wholly abstract, recipe-like exercises in 
what is now known as linear algebra is a practice, largely hidden from 
sight yet very widely-spread at the time and carried out as an activity in 
the streets and the marketplaces of China’s towns, of everyday calculations 
performed with great agility by means of counting rods. Fangcheng 方程 is 
the name of this manner of posing certain non-trivial arithmetical problems 
and almost instantly resolving them by means of manipulations with those 
rods, on the possible material remnants of which Hart is curiously silent. In 
other words, Hart wants us to regard these Ming treatises as the admittedly 
rare superstructures of a flourishing routine activity discernible (but how 
exactly?) underneath the surface of those abstract disquisitions. According 
to Florence Hsia’s review in the September 2015 issue of Isis (p. 713-716), it 
may well be that here is where the most enduringly valuable contribution 
to scholarship of Hart’s book is situated. 
On having demonstrated in this manner at least to his own satisfaction 
that Ming mathematics never underwent the steep decline often attributed 
to the period, Hart is ready for his second empirical point, to wit, that Xu 
Guangqi and other allegedly Christian converts falsely invoked the alleged 
decline in order to present Euclid’s Elements as precisely what mathematics 
was in need of to usher in a renewed flourishing period, not only for 
mathematics but for empirical science as well. According to Hart, the 
conceit of these mandarins culminated in their managing, at the service of 
their wrong-headed argument, to “purloin” results of fangcheng while 
hiding from sight where they had found these. It is at this point that Hart 
invokes some early memorials by Xu Guangqi to show that he was really a 
very poor mathematician who, utterly unlike how he has been portrayed in 
every earlier historical account of the period, was actually given to perversely 
denouncing a significant portion of China’s past for the benefit of his own 
career and his own political purposes. 
The clause just italicized may serve as a bridge to the second, more 
spacious portion of the present review, which from here on consists of a 
critical account of the relentless dichotomization readily apparent in the 
methodological and historiographical disquisitions with which Hart’s 
books opens and closes, not to mention the ongoing reiteration of their 
basic thrust throughout the book (“I shall be arguing that…”; “I argue here 
that...”; “I have argued/demonstrated that …”). It is hardly a caricature to 
introduce the dichotomy that governs not only the very setup but also the 
selection of topics of the entire book thus (and I say it in my own, not 
Hart’s words): all previous historiography of the role of science in the Jesuit 
mission under the late Ming and the early Qing has been marked by an 
utterly obsolete, profoundly a-historical, really essentialist and teleological 
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not to say hagiographical point of view that ultimately stems from a 
hopelessly reified conception of ‘civilizations’ as if these were real entities 
rather than just imagined concepts at the service of historical explanation. 
Indeed, throughout the book Hart sets himself up as the man single-
handedly to minister the cures for all these grave defects. How he came to 
those cures is the subject of the conversion story, related at great, self-
indulging length, with which he opens the book. They come down to a 
prescription not to employ any other concepts than those handled by the 
historical actors themselves, at the service of a truly historicized account of 
the past, in particular the past as being allegedly considered here for the 
first time from the Chinese point of view rather than that of the early 
Jesuits and their infamous crony, Xu Guangqi. Again, I am overstating 
slightly, but really no more than slightly, the gist of the author’s unceasing 
hammering on these very points. 
What we have here, then, is a philosopher’s admonition to us historians 
finally to cease treating history as if the past were set on its way toward 
some pre-established goal, and instead to take historical context properly 
into account. Let me readily admit that it is precisely Hart’s stridently 
condescending me-against-all-you-dumb-historians rhetoric that has made 
me progressively more annoyed with a book I once began to read with 
high expectations. Even apart from the fact that few if any serious 
historians of science still approach history in a genuinely teleological 
manner at all, Hart’s admonition invites the question to what extent it is 
justified in the empirical portion of his book by any real, rather than just 
rhetorically attained, enhancement of our understanding of the episode. 
Drawing on my own expertise and my own reading, I shall now complete 
this review by subjecting Roger Hart’s book to four distinct test-cases. One 
concerns musical theory in a mathematical setting—the calculation of equal 
temperament written down c. 1604 by Zhu Zaiyu 朱載育 (1536-1611). The 
next is the vexed question, the scholarly resolution of which has been 
pioneered by Joseph Needham, of how to deal in a historically responsible 
manner with the sudden reappearance in a given civilization of some 
discovery or invention made far earlier in a different one. Then I treat, 
succinctly and in the most impartial manner that I can muster, what Roger 
Hart has preferred to ignore in my own work of 1994 and 2010 regarding 
the making of viable comparisons between the history of science in China 
and in ancient Greece as a solid foundation for answering ‘Needham’s 
question’ of why modern science arose in Europe rather than elsewhere. 
Finally, and most importantly, I shall devote some well-deserved space to 
comparing Peter Engelfriet’s 1998 book Euclid in China with Hart’s book of 
2013. 
Hart’s brief, mathematics-centered treatment of some musical theory 
first. The advanced arithmetic that, in Zhu Zaiyu’s expert hands, produced 
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the fractions for equal temperament in far more accurate detail than was 
attained at the time in Europe, turns out to be interesting indeed—for a 
historian of the science of music in its European setting these are surely 
revealing passages. But what about the historical context in which these 
fractions made their appearance? For the student of European thinking 
about matters of tuning and temperament, the equal variety fits in well 
enough with a specific developmental line of thought about music in the 
European tradition expressed in the Pythagoras-inspired idea of cosmic 
harmony.1 But in what specific context may Zhu Zaiyu’s calculation of the 
same temperament have come about? After all, there is a huge difference 
between Chinese pentatonic music and the European tonal system, based 
as it is instead on seven white keys per octave on the piano (to give, for 
ease’s sake, an utterly anachronistic definition). So on finding in Roger Hart 
an author not only discussing Zhu Zaiyu’s refined calculation of equal 
temperament but also loudly declaring himself in favor of a contextual 
approach to the history of science I looked forward with great anticipation 
to finally learning how the calculation fitted in with a pentatonic scale 
system. Was I in for disappointment! For context we get served up nothing 
but the well-known, close connection in the Chinese tradition between 
music and ritual. Thus, Hart simply leaves that portion of the relevant 
context that rests in the most basic musical question, namely, what notes to 
make music with, out of consideration entirely, naïvely speaking of “the 
musical scale” (p. 122) as if its indeterminacy were not the central fact of 
music making the entire world over. If this is what the writing of 
contextual history in faithful accordance with Hart’s prescriptions comes 
down to … 
An even more striking absence of really indispensable context concerns 
a far-reaching claim made by Hart about the similarity that he notes 
between Leonardo Fibonacci da Pisa‘s Liber Abaci (1202) and the fangcheng 
practice with counting rods that he posits to underlie those Ming treatises 
in linear algebra. His straightforward claim is that similarity allows no other 
explanation than direct or indirect adoption; in other words, that Leonardo 
must have picked up the computing methods he describes in his booklet 
from those earlier Chinese practices. Must have indeed, for Hart does not 
take the trouble to produce even one shred of empirical evidence for any 
tangible route of transmission at all. Practice is just tacitly taken to spread 
more or less everywhere and to do so without leaving written traces—two 
presuppositions that conveniently absolve the historian from seeking any 
empirical evidence at all for his wide-ranging claims. Not even Joseph 
Needham, in his convoluted argument about whose shoulders the burden 
                                                            
1 Prins & Cohen (in press), passim. 
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of proof in such a case should properly be placed upon, did make things 
quite so easy for himself as, half a century later, Roger Hart does.2 
In my The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographical Inquiry of 1994 I have 
discussed at some length the question of where in the complex issue of 
transcultural transmission of knowledge properly to situate the burden of 
proof. I did so as part of an over a hundred pages-long discussion of an 
even larger issue—the historiographical vicissitudes of ‘Needham’s 
Question’ of why modern science arose in Europe, not in China. In a later 
book, entitled How Modern Science Comes Into the World. Four Civilizations, 
One 17th Century Breakthrough, published in 2010 and equally ignored by 
Hart, I took up the question all over again and now sought to answer it by 
invoking the long-term absence in the Chinese case as compared to the 
threefold manifestation in its Greek counterpart of a phenomenon that I 
called ‘cultural transplantation’. That is, the kind of refreshment that may 
greatly benefit or even transform a given body of knowledge once it is 
being dropped into a new cultural setting happened three times to the 
Greek corpus of natural pursuit (transplantation to, successively, the 
Islamic world, medieval Europe, and Renaissance Europe) but never to its 
Chinese counterpart, which basically remained locked up in itself until far 
into the 19th century. This particular pathway toward explaining how 
modern science could arise in Europe rather than in China may of course 
be right or wrong or anything in between, but not perhaps serve as a fitting 
object of the kind of wholesale neglect meted out to it by Hart in spite of his 
fashionable, deeply uninformed railing against the very notion of the 
Scientific Revolution of the 17th century. 
Returning now for a moment to the man who asked the Needham 
Question and gave it so compelling a turn as to inspire entire generations 
to pursue the question further, it is hardly Needham only whose work is 
relegated by Hart to the dustbin of teleological hagiography—every 
historian preceding Hart is. It is only in the occasional footnote that Hart 
briefly mentions a few historians who are implied rather than declared to 
be exempt, to some undefined extent, from those sins against proper 
history writing that Hart keeps castigating over the length and breadth of 
his book. It is here that we encounter the names of such seasoned experts as 
Karine Chemla, Catherine Jami, or Peter Engelfriet. Since the latter’s book 
Euclid in China, preceding Hart’s book by fifteen years, is easily the most 
comprehensive study of the subject to date, it is particularly interesting to 
examine how Hart deals with it. Well, he doesn’t. Why not? Because, so I 
cannot help thinking, if he had done so he would ipso facto have exposed 
the utter untenability of the historiographical dichotomy that lies at the 
heart of his own book. It is precisely the subtly contextual approach 
                                                            
2 Needham (1970), p. 70; comp. Cohen (1994), p. 436. 
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consistently taken by Engelfriet that makes the latter’s analyses so superior. 
Take the snippets of evidence about Xu that Hart has carefully selected 
with a view to underwriting his own portrait of Xu as a mathematical 
bungler ready to purloin innovative work of early Ming mathematicians to 
serve his own agenda. In radical contrast, Engelfriet has fifteen years earlier 
acquainted us with the full plethora of Xu’s pertinent writings. He has 
made it clear over and above all else that what, for Xu and some like-
minded scholars, singled out Euclid’s work as compared to mathematics in 
the Chinese tradition rested in Euclid’s axiomatic method centered on the 
early Greek idea of proof. Engelfriet has not, of course, put the singular 
significance of that idea forward as an in any way novel insight; novel is 
rather that Hart will have none of it. In order to counter the standard view 
of the singularity of the Euclidean-axiomatic method and the profound 
impression it made on Xu and some contemporaneous and later ‘converts’, 
Hart comes up with the extraordinary argument that one cannot properly 
speak of an axiomatic method prior to its rigorous definition by Frege and 
Hilbert some three centuries later. It has been some time since I came across 
so grossly an anachronistic argument, really teleological-in-reverse, as here 
put forward by Hart. And yes, such are the lengths to which he is 
apparently prepared to go in order to shore up a grossly untenable thesis. 
This is hardly the place to delve much further into Engelfriet’s truly 
contextual, truly historicizing study. If you really want to learn about ‘the 
first encounter between China and the West’, then Engelfriet’s, not Hart’s 
book is where to go. There you find set forth the prehistory of Euclid 
translations in Europe; the Jesuits’ motives for sponsoring the joint 
translation of Father Clavius’ version of the Elements into Chinese; the 
translation itself; what Xu admired in the Euclid approach to mathematics 
and how that fitted in with his own position and ambitions at the late Ming 
court; the varied uses the translation was put to under the Qing. While 
discussing all this and more, Engelfriet has also taken up the well-known 
question of whether or not the Chinese language even allows proper 
translation of typically Greek concepts like axiom, proof, or equality. Hart 
dedicates in his customary all-or-nothing style an entire chapter, filled with 
strawmen, to the question, carefully ignoring the brief, sober, sensible 
treatment that Engelfriet already gave it fifteen years earlier. All in all, so 
Engelfriet instructively concluded his own book, even though Euclid’s style 
of proof never really caught on in 17th or 18th century China on a scale 
larger than with a variety of diffuse individuals, the never quite forgotten 
presence of the Jihe Yuanben did pave the way for its renewed, this time 
wholesale reception starting about half-way the 19th century. 
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